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The wide-body long-range aircrafts market is characterized by increasing rivalry between Airbus and Boeing. One of the factors that
drive their strategic behaviour is technological. We propose a technology indicator to identify conditions under which the aircraft
companies have incentives to join a coalition. For this, we provide measurement of the side-payments necessary to sign a strategic
alliance aimed at reducing technological barriers in the market. The results suggest that the existence of side-payments guarantees the
stability of a strategic alliance if the gap in the technological level between the ﬁrms is high, or competition is through prices. For
monopoly, a strategic alliance is proﬁtable, but never stable.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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A close relationship exists between the technology and
the strategic interactions of the aircraft ﬁrms. The aircraft
industry is characterized by the rivalry between Airbus and
Boeing and the adopting of mainly price-taker behaviour
(Benkard, 2004; Esposito, 2004). However, both suppliers
aim to monopolize the market by increasing the techno-
logical barriers over time. In fact, Boeing has monopolized
the large long-range aircraft segment of the market for over
30 years with the B747 and, is developing the B787 to
satisfy the preferences of the airlines that do not require a
super speed aircraft, but a long-range, fuel efﬁcient, low-
cost machine capable of directly connecting any two cities
in the world. Airbus aims to become the world leader by
involving large Japanese companies (FHL, KHL and
MHI) in the production of the A380—a plane of huge
capacity—and the A350 aircraft—a direct competitor with
the B787.
At the beginning of the 1960s, the technological growth
in aviation was found in engine design as the piston enginee front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
irtraman.2007.01.003
ing author.
ess: maria.berrittella@unipa.it (M. Berrittella).gave way to the jet engine. This allowed aircraft with
greater capacity and higher speeds. Innovations came with
the introduction of new materials (ultralight alloys, carbon
ﬁbre), further developments in propulsion systems—high
bypass ratios and use of electronics allowed fuel saving and
improved reliability, safety, and speed (Cabral and
Kretschmer, 2001). There were, however, trade-offs to be
considered, for example, between speed and fuel consump-
tion that involved technology choices.
To reduce technological barriers, aircraft manufacturers
built up complex horizontal and vertical networks of
relationships (Schmitt, 2000; Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2001).
For example, in the 1960s, projects for a supersonic
transport aircraft became a reality because of two
agreements. One was between British company Bristol
Siddley and the French company Snecma to develop the
Olympus Engine; the second was between the British
Aerospace Corporation and the French company Sud
Aviation-Socie´te´ National de Constructions Ae´ronautiques
to develop Concorde. More recently, new forms of
cooperation between BAE Systems, Boeing, EADS and
Lockheed Martin are emerging. This tendency towards
horizontal relationships grows because the costs of devel-
oping new planes are so high but proﬁt margins are low
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Fig. 1. Trend of the aircraft average speed.
M. Berrittella et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 13 (2007) 139–148140requiring global markets for full cost recovery. According
to Benkard (2004), prices are often below marginal costs.
For example, Lockheed L-1011 had marginal costs higher
than prices for 14 years, with resultant substantial ﬁnancial
loss for the manufacturer.
Vertical relationships are closely linked to technology
levels. By investigating agreements between ﬁrms over
aircrafts’ production cycles for the last 50 years, Esposito
shows that the higher the technology level, the larger is the
number of vertical agreements. This is because that the
higher the technology level involved, the greater are costs
and thus the need to broaden market risk sharing.
Although there is a substantial literature that examines
strategic behaviour of the aircraft producers (Pavcnik,
2002), it lacks analysis of how technological barriers affects
strategic alliances. Here, we look at how technology levels
affect agreements between Airbus and Boeing in the wide-
body long-range market.1 First, we develop a measure of
technology on the basis of four parameters: maximum
take-off weight, ﬂight range, number of available seats, and
direct operating costs. Furthermore, we deﬁne the unit cost
function of the resultant technology index. This is used to
discuss conditions where upon a strategic alliance would
materialise and to deﬁne the size of the side-payment
necessary to sign an agreement to reduce the technology
barriers in the market.
2. Technology index
An aircraft’s design is based on many parameters related
to the different technological solutions (i.e. aircraft price,
available seats, number and type of engines, maximum
take-off weight, cruising speed, range, size, and operating
costs). Unlike Esposito, we do not consider speed relevant1We rely our analysis to the case of wide-body long-range aircrafts and
to the rivalry between Airbus and Boeing, due to limits in data availability.to provide information on the aircraft’s technological level,
because the World Jet Inventory (2004) database from 1974
to 2004 shows a trend of cruising speed decreasing over time
for all aircraft categories—narrow-body short range, wide-
body medium and long range (Fig. 1). Initially, the increase
in aircraft speed was due to the introduction of jet engines
but since 1980, this parameter has assumed a secondary
importance in the purchase choices of airlines. The strategy
of the airlines is now based more on costs saving, notably
fuel costs and direct operating costs saving, speed.
An index that focuses on the major improvements of the
aircraft in relation to reductions in weight associated with
using new materials (ultra light alloys, carbon ﬁbre) can be
deﬁned as
ITi ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
MTOWmin
RANGEmin SEATmin
MTOWi
RANGEi SEATi
" #2
þ UDOCmin
UDOCi
 2vuut , (1)
where for aircraft i, MTOWi is the maximum take-off
weight, RANGEi is the ﬂight range, SEATi is the number of
available seats and UDOCi are the unit direct operating
costs.MTOWmin, RANGEmin , SEATmin and UDOCmin are
the minimums of the maximum take-off weight, ﬂight
range, number of available seats and unit direct operating
costs across aircraft. Fig. 2 shows the index from 1974 to
2004 for the wide-body long-range aircrafts. The increasing
trend is due to technical progress in aircraft construction
materials.3. Model
We deﬁne a speciﬁc form of ﬁrm conduct, without
assuming the form of competition. Suppose that ﬁrm i
maximizes its proﬁts given by
max
qi
piðqiÞ ¼ ðp ciÞqiðpÞ. (2)
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Fig. 2. Trend of the technological indexes for the wide-body long-range aircrafts.
M. Berrittella et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 13 (2007) 139–148 141In Eq. (2), p is the market price, qi(p) is the demand for the
product, and ci is the marginal cost of product qi(p). More
speciﬁcally, the product demand of ﬁrm i is
qiðpi; pjÞ ¼ O
X
jai
sijpj  pi
 !
, (3)
where sij is a distribution parameter indicating the degree
of substitutability between aircrafts i and j within the
market. Furthermore, the market demand Q is
QðpÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
qiðpÞ ¼ Op, (4)
where e is the demand elasticity and O is a constant
parameter.2
Eq. (2) ideally requires information on unit cost of
production ci. Unfortunately, we do not have access to
detailed cost data. Also, there is a lack of prior estimates of
functional forms relating costs to technology levels in the
aircrafts market. Thus, analysis is been based on a set of
assumption:
ciðITiÞ ¼ ITaii , (5)
where ITi is the technological level as deﬁned in Eq. (1),
and ai a parameter. It follows that if the technology level of
ﬁrm I’s aircraft increases, its unit costs increase more
rapidly if ai40.
We consider three market structures: duopoly (Cournot
and Bertrand), monopoly and cooperation. These broadly
represent how the aircraft industry has been characterized
at various times. In fact, although there are may potentially
be many aircrafts manufacturers, not only high technolo-
gical barriers, but also substantial ﬁnancial and market
barriers, in the large aircraft market now limits it to two
ﬁrms with monopoly within some segments. The equili-
brium solutions seen in Table 1 are standard to economic2This formulation of market demand was used by Verleger (1972), Nero
and Black (1998) and Carlsson (2002) to model air travel demand.theory, but the modelling framework allows isolation of
situations under which an aircraft producer has an
incentive to sign a strategic alliance to reduce barriers in
the market.
Suppose there are two ﬁrms, each could seek to induce
the other to sign a strategic alliance by offering side-
payments. The level of these can be interpreted as a
measure of the difﬁculty that will be encountered in
reaching an agreement. The higher the side-payment, the
higher are the barriers to agree. The side payment is an
incentive to do ex-ante negotiations for a strategic alliance.
Let Ti be the minimum non-negative payment to ﬁrm i
necessary to make cooperation more attractive than any
other market structure, that is if pi,coop*(  )+TiXpi,n*(  ),
we have
Ti ¼ maxf0;pi;nðÞ  pi;coopðÞg, (6)
where pi,coop* and pi,n* are the proﬁts with cooperation and
the proﬁts in any other market structure (e.g. a duopoly or
monopoly), for ﬁrm i. The higher is Ti, the more difﬁculty
it is to make an agreement.
A strategic alliance will take place if two conditions
occur: proﬁtability and stability. An agreement is proﬁtable
if each ﬁrm gains from joining the alliance, that is
pi;coop þ TiXpi;n 8i. (7)
The side-payment may be zero for one ﬁrm, but not for
both ﬁrms.
An agreement is stable if ﬁrm j has an incentive to
transfer the side-payments to ﬁrm i, that is, if the
willingness-to-pay by ﬁrm j for transferring the side-
payment to ﬁrm i, deﬁned as WTAj, is greater than the
side-payment to ﬁrm i:
WTAjXTi, (8)
where
WTAj ¼ pj;coopðÞ  pj;n. (9)
WTAj may be zero for one ﬁrm, but not for both ﬁrms.
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Our analysis is concentrated on wide-body long-range
aircraft characterized by having a double aisle, a capacity
of up to 550 passengers, and a range of up to 16,000 km;
aircraft in this category are the Boeing 747, the Boeing 777,
the Airbus 330 and the Airbus 340.
Demand in Eq. (4) is estimated using the data on prices
and sales of 16 wide-body long-range aircraft (Tables 2 and
3).3 We used the log–regression model:
ln Q ¼ ln Oþ  ln Pþ e, (10)
where O is a constant term e is the price coefﬁcient, that in
the log-model is also the demand elasticity, and eA(0,1) is a
random error. The parameters O and e are estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS). We ﬁnd O is 1.78 109 and e
is 3.18. The estimates of price elasticity conﬁrm previous
results for the wide-body long-range market.4 The ex-
planatory power of the model is not exceptional, with a
coefﬁcient of determination of 0.43. However, given the
volatility of the aircraft market and the difﬁculty in
collecting data, this relatively low value is acceptable; the
95% conﬁdence interval of the F-test provides further
conﬁdence that the regression estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant as a whole. Furthermore, the degree of
substitutability between aircrafts in Eq. (3) has been set
equal to 0.45 (Irwin and Pavcnik, 2004).
The technology levels (IT) for Airbus and Boeing are
calculated collected using data on price, maximum take-off
weight, ﬂight range, number of available seats, and unit
direct operating costs, with 12 observations for any
producer. IT is equal to 0.88 for Airbus and 0.98 for
Boeing.
Finally, we test the sensitivity of the results for the range
0.7pITp1.2 and for aiA[3, 3]; these can be considered
plausible parameters for the unit costs function in Eq. (5).5. Simulation results
The aircraft industry has been more and more char-
acterized by rivalry between Airbus and Boeing. Figs. 3
and 4 show the two ﬁrms’ proﬁts under various duopoly
models. For many values of a, competition in quantity is
more apparent than competition in prices. This is
conﬁrmed by sensitivity analysis of the technology index,
reported in Figs. 5 and 6. As the technology index
increases, and for the highest values of a, proﬁts are
almost insensitive as to whether ﬁrms compete in prices or
quantities. This is because costs increase rapidly and,
hence, in Cournot duopoly the proﬁts converge to zero,
whereas, in Bertrand duopoly the ﬁrm with the highest
costs makes zero proﬁts.3Price data are from the magazine Airline Fleet & Network Manage-
ment, and quantity data from World Jet Inventory (2004) database.
4See for example Irwin and Pavcnik (2004) for rigorous estimates of
price elasticities.
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Table 2
Average values of deliveries for wide-body long-range segment (1989–2004)
Year Deliveries Price ($millions) MTOW (kg) Capacity (No. of pax) Range (km) UDOC ($/kmpax) NIT
1989 45 216.00 382,197 444 12,850 0.0340 0.953
1990 73 213.42 377,983 440 12,857 0.0341 0.952
1991 95 195.51 351,209 408 13,057 0.0349 0.949
1992 103 190.39 349,084 419 13,275 0.0346 0.975
1993 115 180.57 335,528 390 13,426 0.0354 0.949
1994 91 175.43 325,282 375 13,274 0.0359 0.931
1995 105 165.99 289,040 355 12,192 0.0369 0.911
1996 111 170.71 292,375 360 12,210 0.0367 0.910
1997 157 176.78 300,877 367 12,752 0.0363 0.936
1998 186 183.63 307,016 386 12,563 0.0357 0.952
1999 202 180.02 296,493 377 12,345 0.0361 0.946
2000 146 173.14 285,429 362 12,284 0.0366 0.933
2001 151 177.05 292,409 369 12,375 0.0363 0.939
2002 132 177.28 295,864 369 12,498 0.0363 0.940
2003 122 173.96 299,605 358 12,950 0.0366 0.931
2004 126 171.45 292,101 345 12,883 0.0371 0.919
Table 3
Aircrafts for wide-body long-range segment
Aircraft Entry year Price 2005, ($106) MTOW (kg) Capacity (no. of pax) Range (km)
A300B4-600 1984 117 165,900 266 7600
A310 1983 92.3 157,000 220 8825
787-3 2010 130 163,296 296 6500
767 133.25 190,057 262 11,328
767-200ER 1982 118.3 179,170 232 12,223
767-300ER 1986 134.8 186,880 279 11,306
767-400ER 2001 146.6 204,120 274 10,454
MD-11 1990 153.2 279,651 344 13,020
A330 138.8 231,500 294 11,500
A330-300 1993 144.4 231,500 315 10,500
A330-200 1998 133.2 231,500 273 12,500
A340 156.55 325,188 307 14,744
A340-200 1993 135.4 275,000 239 14,800
A340-300 1993 138.2 275,750 295 13,525
A340-500 2002 176.3 376,000 313 16,400
A340-600 2002 176.3 374,000 380 14,250
777 208.7 308,263 373 13,407
777-200 1995 180 247,210 372 9649
777-200ER 1997 191.4 297,560 370 14,316
777-300 1998 212 297,560 456 11,029
777-300ER 2004 239.5 351,534 365 14,594
777-200LR 2006 220.5 347,452 301 17,446
747 219 404,833 470 13,827
747-400 1989 216 396,890 470 13,450
747-400ER 2002 223 412,775 470 14,205
A380 2006 282.1 560,000 555 15,000
787-8 2008 130 217,728 223 15,700
M. Berrittella et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 13 (2007) 139–148 143However, there may be situations in which one of the
ﬁrms would gain through cooperation rather than in
competitive duopoly. From the Cournot solution, a
strategic alliance is proﬁtable without side-payments for
Airbus if ao1 and for Boeing if a40.5 (Figs. 7 and 8). If
there are side-payments the agreement is always proﬁtable.
But the strategic alliance is stable only for 1pap1
(Fig. 9). Table 4 shows that if one of the ﬁrms decreases itsIT, the strategic alliance is stable for ao0.5. Summarizing,
the larger the gap between the technology index of the two
ﬁrms and thus the larger the gap in the costs between the
ﬁrms, the more an agreement will be stable if there are side-
payments.
From the Bertrand solution, a strategic alliance is
proﬁtable without side-payments for Airbus if ap0
and for Boeing if a40 (Figs. 7 and 8). If there are
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M. Berrittella et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 13 (2007) 139–148144side-payments the agreement is not only proﬁtable, but
also stable for any value of a (Fig. 10) This result is
conﬁrmed if the technology index changes (Table 5). Again
the intuition of these results is seen through the differencein the costs of the two ﬁrms. In the Bertrand solution, if the
differential in costs is small, the solution approximates
competition and the size of the side-payments approx-
imates zero. If the costs differential is high, the ﬁrm with
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M. Berrittella et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 13 (2007) 139–148 145the highest costs makes zero proﬁts, although if an
agreement is reached proﬁts become positive. Thus,
through side-payments, reﬂecting the differential in proﬁts,
it can always stimualte the other ﬁrm to sign an agreement.
But both Airbus and Boeing have sought to monopolize
the market rather than to engage in a strategic alliance; thisbecause both would gain more individually if they were a
monopoly than in a competitive duopoly or with coopera-
tion. This result is straight from economic theory, but one
question that arises concerning the way side-payments may
act to deter a strategic alliances from leading to a
monopoly. Figs. 11 and 12 show that the existence of
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Fig. 9. From Cournot duopoly to agreement.
Table 4
Side-payments for strategic alliances from Cournot duopoly
IT Airbus Boeing
a 0.7 0.88 1.2 0.7 0.98 1.2
3.00 39 (596) 0 (0) 67,756 (0) 0 (0) 10,210 (0) 78,795 (0)
2.50 0 (1195) 0 (0) 48,474 (0) 0 (491) 8407 (0) 62,849 (0)
2.00 0 (2071) 0 (0) 32,343 (0) 0 (1406) 6418 (0) 46,332 (0)
1.50 0 (3362) 0 (0) 19,343 (0) 0 (2860) 4275 (1207) 30,444 (0)
1.00 0 (4498) 0 (0) 9342 (0) 0 (4961) 2015 (3071) 16,372 (0)
0.50 0 (4653) 0 (313) 2113 (0) 0 (5752) 0 (4181) 5119 (0)
0.00 0 (2651) 0 (2651) 0 (2651) 0 (2651) 0 (2651) 0 (2651)
0.50 6957 (0) 0 (4931) 0 (6700) 3319 (0) 0 (369) 0 (5313)
1.00 25,985 (0) 2802 (4270) 0 (7233) 15,891 (0) 0 (0) 0 (6267)
1.50 57,288 (0) 7009 (1979) 0 (5295) 38,738 (0) 0 (0) 0 (5909)
2.00 103,266 (0) 12,408 (0) 0 (3354) 76,786 (0) 0 (0) 0 (4655)
2.50 165,507 (0) 19,164 (0) 0 (1709) 136,447 (0) 0 (0) 0 (3383)
3.00 244,557 (0) 27,445 (0) 0 (378) 225,836 (0) 0 (0) 0 (2335)
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Fig. 10. From Bertrand duopoly to agreement.
M. Berrittella et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 13 (2007) 139–148146side-payments would increase the proﬁtable of an
alliance, but it is instable, because the willingness-to-pay
by each ﬁrm is lower than the size of the side-payment
claimed by the other which is monopolist. The same resultoccurs applying the sensitivity analysis to the technology
index.
If the ﬁrms compete on quantity, the main factor that
guarantees the stability of any agreement is that the gap in
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 5
Side-payments for strategic alliances from Bertrand duopoly
IT Airbus Boeing
a 0.7 0.88 1.2 0.7 0.98 1.2
3.00 39 (2346) 0 (11,158) 0 (54,9185) 0 (0) 445 (4240) 0 (69,291)
2.50 0 (3518) 0 (9431) 0 (205,694) 0 (491) 2183 (3418) 0 (26,869)
2.00 0 (5190) 0 (7998) 0 (85,776) 0 (1406) 3659 (2982) 0 (6674)
1.50 0 (7656) 0 (6800) 2632 (35,694) 0 (2860) 4938 (2881) 0 (0)
1.00 0 (11,294) 0 (5794) 6580 (11,341) 0 (5033) 6071 (3074) 1707 (0)
0.50 0 (16,661) 0 (4946) 7927 (702) 0 (8114) 7100 (3530) 6659 (0)
0.00 8061 (16,516) 8061 (16,516) 8061 (16,516) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
0.50 7694 (1341) 8372 (16,765) 0 (20,148) 9284 (0) 0 (0) 0 (9981)
1.00 561 (18,896) 8441 (17,268) 0 (16,517) 8356 (0) 0 (0) 0 (7942)
1.50 0 (42,389) 8096 (18,198) 0 (13,540) 415 (30,596) 0 (0) 0 (6170)
2.00 0 (93,879) 7075 (19,818) 0 (11,100) 0 (148,086) 0 (0) 0 (4655)
2.50 0 (212,654) 4976 (22,529) 0 (9099) 0 (581,561) 0 (0) 0 (3383)
3.00 0 (496,592) 1197 (26,934) 0 (7459) 0 (2370,955) 0 (0) 0 (2335)
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Fig. 11. From monopoly by Airbus to agreement.
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M. Berrittella et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 13 (2007) 139–148 147the technology level between the two ﬁrms is large. For
monopoly, the existence of side-payments does not
guarantee the stability of the alliance.6. Conclusions
Our analysis has focused on the rivalry between Airbus
and Boeing in the wide-body long-range airline market
segment. But the results are striking. It has been shown
that speed is not a relevant parameter in technical
consideration, but other parameters, such as maximum
take-off weight, are more relevant. This conﬁrms the
strategy adopted by Boeing in its production of the B787
that aims to satisfy the needs of airlines that do not require
a super speed aircraft, but rather seek a single, cost
efﬁciency aircraft that can to connect cities everywhere in
the world without the need to use congested hubs.
Furthermore, there are conditions under which the ﬁrms
may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sign a strategic alliance that ends
up being stable. The existence of side-payments guarantees
that such agreements are proﬁtable for the manufacturers
involved. Stability occurs if the agreement emanates from
competition, for example, from Bertrand duopoly, but is
not guaranteed if the agreement comes from monopoly.Acknowledgements
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